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HOMESICK: HOW HOUSING
TAX BREAKS BENEFIT THE
WEALTHY AND CREATE
MCMANSIONS
Andrew Hanson, Ike Brannon
and Zackary Hawley
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The U.S. federal tax code provides large subsidies,
in the form of tax breaks, for housing consumption.
These tax breaks include the deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes, as well as the capital
gains exclusion on home sale proﬁts. Together, these
tax breaks amount to $175 billion in foregone revenues to the U.S. Treasury each year.
• For millions of families who struggle to afford a
house, these tax breaks offer no relief at all. Most
personal income tax ﬁlers take the standard deduction, rather than itemizing deductions. Because most
tax breaks are in the form of deductions, and the tax
code has a progressive rate structure, the beneﬁts
from housing tax breaks increase disproportionately
with income.
• Beneﬁts from the largest housing tax break, the

deduction for mortgage interest, differ across metropolitan areas and among income groups within
metropolitan areas. We ﬁnd the mortgage interest
deduction overwhelmingly beneﬁts taxpayers earning more than $100,000 per year across all metropolitan areas in our sample. We also ﬁnd that major metropolitan areas on the East and West coasts get the
most tax relief from the mortgage interest deduction.
• Within metropolitan areas, beneﬁts from the
mortgage interest deduction accrue almost entirely
to taxpayers in suburban and exurban areas. We
demonstrate that the share of taxpayers beneﬁting
from this deduction is in many cases 2 times as large
in suburban areas as it is in inner city and inner ring
suburbs.
• Taking the sum total of all tax breaks for housing,
we ﬁnd they generate substantially different cost savings across metropolitan areas. These cost savings do
not result in higher homeownership rates, but instead
in the purchase of larger, more expensive homes. We
estimate that houses today, depending on the metropolitan area in question, are from 250 to 1,000 square
feet larger than they otherwise would be, owing to
the package of tax breaks.
• If increasing home ownership is to remain a goal
of the federal government—and we are not convinced
that it should be—then tax breaks for housing need to
be reformed or eliminated. To encourage homeownership, federal housing subsidies should be more nar-
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rowly targeted to middle-income households buying
inexpensive houses. With the congressional tax-writing committees hoping to accomplish comprehensive
tax reform within the next year, housing tax breaks
represent the best way to generate the revenue necessary to push tax rates down.

INTRODUCTION
Since its inception a century ago, the individual income
tax code has been exceedingly generous to homeowners.
Homeowners may deduct the interest paid on up to $1 million in mortgage loan debt; an additional $100,000 in debt
backed by home equity; and state and local property taxes.
The tax code also exempts nearly all capital gains from the
sale of a primary residence from tax payments.1
This paper examines the tax breaks for housing and has four
central ﬁndings:
1.

The value of the most noticeable and popular of
these tax breaks, the mortgage interest deduction
(MID), differs vastly across income groups and
metropolitan areas. For example, among Chicago
taxpayers who earn less than $100,000, less than 25
percent take the mortgage interest deduction and
they save an average of $1,900 in taxes. Among taxpayers who earn more than $100,000, 78 percent take
the MID and, on average, their tax savings are 2.5
times as large as those earning less than $100,000

2.

The beneﬁts from the MID are heavily skewed
toward suburban areas of major metropolitan
areas, with the typical suburb having between 1.5
and 2 times the share of taxpayers claiming the
deduction.

3.

The total package of housing tax breaks greatly
reduces the cost of consuming housing, but does
so unevenly across metropolitan areas. Tax breaks
reduce the annual cost of owning a home by more
than $10,000 in places like Los Angeles, but by less
than $2,000 in Atlanta.

4.

The cost reduction caused by housing tax breaks
does little to induce homeownership, but instead

1. Internal Revenue Service regulations state that the exclusion is allowed for owners
who use a home as their “main home” for a total of two of the last ﬁve years prior
to sale. The regulation also makes clear that in cases of split residency throughout a
calendar year, there is only one primary residence to which the exclusion applies. In
cases where residence is split across multiple years, for example two years of consistent residency in one home followed by two years of consistency in another home,
the exclusion can apply to both homes as long as they are not sold in the same two
year period. IRS publication 523 provides complete deﬁnitions and details on the
capital gains exclusion.

contributes to the building of larger, McMansionstyle homes.2 We estimate that houses today are
between 250 and 1,000 square feet larger than they
otherwise would be, owing to the package of tax
breaks. This is because the deductions are claimed
overwhelming by upper-income tax ﬁlers, who are
not on the margin between owning and renting a
home. Instead, the size of the tax breaks help them
decide how much extra space to purchase or build.
Proponents of housing tax breaks liken homeownership to
apple pie and the American ﬂag, arguing that homeownership leads to greater community engagement and a plethora
of other socially desirable behaviors. Without the tax breaks,
proponents argue, millions of Americans who currently are
homeowners would otherwise be unable to purchase a home.
This argument has two ﬂaws. The notion that homeownership induces salutary behaviors – rather than it simply
being the case that such habits are correlated with having
the wherewithal to buy a house – is a dubious proposition,
more wishful thinking than accepted wisdom. An even bigger problem facing apologists for the current system is that
the existing tax breaks do almost nothing to increase homeownership. Instead, they mostly serve to encourage people
who already have the ﬁnancial means to buy a house to purchase larger homes and take on more debt. The ability to
deduct mortgage interest and property taxes, in fact, gives
very little to a middle-class family who would otherwise be
on the margin of affording to buy a home.
A major ﬂaw in the design of existing homeownership incentives is that most are tax deductions, which by deﬁnition are
more valuable to those who face higher marginal tax rates.
A progressive tax code like our current system, where marginal rates on income range from 10 percent to nearly 40
percent, means that people who pay only the lowest marginal
tax rates receive relatively modest savings from any deductions. High-income households who pay on income earned
in the top tax brackets receive a much bigger break.
It isn’t just the tax code’s progressivity that skews housing
tax breaks’ beneﬁts toward the wealthy; the fact that households can deduct interest on a mortgage as large as $1 million
means that nearly all homeowners are able to deduct every
dime of the mortgage interest they pay from their taxable
income, even the very wealthy.
The high deductibility limit and the tax code’s progressivity
result in the beneﬁts from the mortgage interest deduction
being widely skewed across the country, both geographically
and across income groups. Homeowners in wealthy com-

2. Other contributing factors to the McMansion phenomena are rising incomes and
the building of transportation infrastructure (especially interstate highways) connecting areas with cheap land to employment centers.
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munities with high housing costs—mainly in the suburbs
of major metropolitan areas on the East and West coasts—
receive tax beneﬁts much larger than those living in less
expensive inner-city neighborhoods or in smaller communities in the middle of the country, where housing prices are
more modest.
To give just one example of the discrepancy in tax beneﬁts,
the average homeowner in the San Francisco area receives
an annual reduction in the cost of home ownership of more
than $12,000 a year from the package of tax beneﬁts available in the federal tax code. By contrast, the average savings
to a home-owning family in Flint, Mich. is barely more than
$500.

HOW MUCH DO HOUSING TAX BREAKS COST
THE TREASURY?
While surveys invariably show that among the public’s
complaints about the tax code complexity is chief, the reality is that, for most people ﬁling an income tax return, the
process is relatively straightforward. Less than one-third
of taxpayers take the trouble to keep track of the various
deductions the code allows for and to put those down on
their returns through the process of “itemizing.” 3 Those
who choose not to itemize generally avail themselves of the
standard deduction, which is $12,200 for married couples,
and then proceed to report a few facts about their income
and family and be done with it.
For middle-class families, the standard deduction is usually
the optimal option, since it constitutes a sizeable fraction of
their income. It would take a lot of spending on tax-deductible goods and services to have itemized deductions that
exceed the optional standard deduction. For a fairly modest
$200,000, 30-year amortized mortgage loan with an interest rate of 4 percent, the tax-deductible interest payments in
the ﬁrst year would be only $8,000, and the proportion of the
loan payment schedule that is comprised of interest would
decline gradually in each successive year. If we assume this
family faces a property tax of 1 percent and gives 2 percent
of its income to charity—roughly the national averages for
each—then the three largest deductions in the code for this
prototypical household sum to the standard deduction. In
other words, this household does not save anything on its
taxes from purchasing a house. And for the 90 percent of all
households with an income of less than $146,400 – the upper
threshold for the 25% tax bracket – each dollar above the
standard deduction reduces their federal tax bill by a mere
25 cents, at most.

Because the U.S. income tax code is progressive, with rates
rising with income, deductions provide more tax savings
to higher-income households. For instance, a household
earning an income of $70,000, which is in the 15 percent tax
bracket, would see a tax savings of $1,200 from a $200,000,
4 percent mortgage. A family with an income of $500,000
would save nearly $3,000 in taxes, or two and a half times
more than the household in the 15 percent tax bracket.
Of course, the tax rate differential is not the only factor driving the difference in tax beneﬁts between the middle class
and the wealthy. The fact that upper-income households
have bigger and more expensive homes further exacerbates
the difference in tax beneﬁts from homeownership. Income
differences and housing differences combine to have a multiplicative impact. A doubling of income more than doubles
the expected tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction, as it boosts the family into higher tax bracket as well
as proportionally increasing the amount they can borrow to
purchase a home.
A household with an income of $500,000 can afford a $1
million mortgage, while a family earning near the national
median income of $51,000 would struggle to afford more
than twenty percent of that. But the tax code awards the
$500,000 household with the large mortgage a much larger
subsidy. For this family, a $1 million dollar mortgage at 4 percent interest results in a tax savings of nearly $16,000 a year,
or more than 10 times that of the family with the national
median income who borrow the cost of an average house
($212,000).
All of these savings for borrowers add up to big bills for the
Treasury. The cost of the tax beneﬁts for owner-occupied
housing sum to $175 billion per annum,4 with the mortgage
interest deduction alone costing the U.S. Treasury roughly
$100 billion each year. The ﬁve-year estimates for these tax
beneﬁts sum to well over $1 trillion.

FEDERAL TAX BENEFITS FOR HOUSING DIFFER
ACROSS THE COUNTRY
Because tax beneﬁts depend on housing costs and income,
the value of tax breaks vary widely across metropolitan areas,
as incomes and home prices differ substantially across the
country. Incomes and home prices tend to be higher around
major metropolitan areas—especially the suburbs—and
along the East and West coasts, while the close-in neighborhoods and inner-ring suburbs5 of most major cities, as well as
4. Not included in the $175 billion is the exclusion of imputed rent from taxable
income, estimated to reduce revenues by $50 billion annually.

3. The latest available IRS data show that 46.2 million tax ﬁlers itemized deductions in
2011, or roughly 32 percent of the total of 145.3 million tax returns.

5. Puentes and Orﬁeld (2002) examine the economic environment of inner-ring
suburbs and report that although they are heterogeneous across metropolitan
areas, they often have older housing and infrastructure and depreciated commercial
areas. These facts, along with lower than average incomes, all contribute to the small
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TABLE 1: TAX SAVINGS FROM MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BETWEEN INCOME GROUPS
(REPRESENTATIVE CITIES)

Tax Filers with <$100K AGI

Tax Filers with >$100K AGI

% with MID
benefit

Average Tax
Savings for
MID Filers

% with MID
benefit

Average Tax
Savings for
MID Filers

Large Metros
Atlanta, GA
Boston, MA
Chicago, IL
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX
Denver, CO
Detroit, MI
Houston, TX
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN
New York City, NY
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
Phoenix, AZ
San Francisco- Oakland, CA
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC-MD-VA

28.62%
21.49%
24.71%
18.00%
29.32%
26.34%
15.84%
19.02%
31.49%
16.80%
23.25%
28.38%
20.40%
25.64%
27.65%

$1,794
$2,101
$1,918
$1,474
$2,199
$1,582
$1,428
$3,210
$1,946
$2,160
$1,616
$2,417
$3,667
$2,541
$2,815

84.76%
77.47%
78.40%
73.60%
82.73%
80.40%
67.69%
74.97%
84.87%
70.72%
80.35%
81.92%
72.40%
77.01%
82.83%

$4,894
$5,068
$4,819
$4,004
$5,183
$4,053
$3,538
$7,548
$4,528
$5,346
$4,316
$5,849
$8,039
$5,716
$6,101

Small Metros
Austin, TX
Baton Rouge, LA
Chattanooga, TN-GA
El Paso, TX
Erie, PA
Flint, MI
Fresno, CA
Peoria, IL
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA
Wichita, KS

20.13%
15.65%
17.07%
10.26%
14.05%
22.04%
18.73%
16.47%
19.59%
18.77%

$1,603
$1,449
$1,411
$1,075
$1,063
$1,345
$2,238
$1,186
$3,691
$1,157

73.11%
68.51%
67.61%
62.88%
67.17%
77.66%
79.86%
65.97%
71.95%
74.41%

$4,142
$3,343
$3,989
$3,209
$2,747
$3,180
$5,105
$2,908
$7,790
$2,723

Large metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a population over 3
million. Smaller metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a
population under 1.5 million.
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FIGURE 1: % BENEFITING BY AGI ACROSS LARGE METROS

Source: Authors’ calculations
Notes: Percentages of ﬁlers with mortgage interest deduction are categorized into two adjusted gross income (AGI) groups: <$100K
and >$100K imply an AGI less than or greater than $100,000, respectively.

the more rural regions of the country, tend to have incomes
and home prices that are lower.

home differ as a result of the tax code across metropolitan
areas.7

Incidentally, the difference in housing prices across the
country are driven not just by differences in demand, but
also differences in supply. In places like New York, California, and the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C., various
regulatory restrictions make building houses more expensive, something Harvard economist Ed Glaeser has amply
documented.6

The data show that the tax savings that accrue from the MID
are highly skewed both across metropolitan areas and across
income groups within the same metropolitan area. They also
vary between central city and suburban locations within a
metro area.

To quantify how the impact of housing tax breaks differ
across various regions of the country, we used a ZIP code
level Internal Revenue Service data ﬁle that contains information on average income, how many tax ﬁlers claim the
mortgage interest deduction, and how much was deducted.
From this information, we can calculate the tax savings from
taking the deduction. We incorporated local housing market
data from the American Housing Survey on property taxes,
debt ﬁnancing, and self-reported home values with the IRS
data to measure how the reductions in the cost of owning a
beneﬁt these areas receive from housing tax beneﬁts.
6. See for example, Glaeser and Ward (2009) that examines land use regulations in
eastern Massachusetts and Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005) that make this point
using data from Manhattan.

The differences across income groups are enormous. In most
cities, tax ﬁlers with an income greater than $100,000 are
between three and four times more likely to take the mortgage interest deduction than taxpayers below that threshold. The average tax savings for high-income households
are more than double those of the lower-income cohort.
Generally, the suburban areas of major metros have a larger
percentage of tax ﬁlers that beneﬁt from the MID, but the
average tax savings in these areas is only slightly larger than
in central cities. Looking at the combined beneﬁt of all housing tax breaks shows that these beneﬁts barely beneﬁt some
smaller cities in the form of reduced housing costs, while
residents of large metro areas on the coasts save well into
ﬁve ﬁgures annually.

7. See the appendix for a full explanation of the model and data sources.
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FIGURE 2: TAX SAVINGS BY AGI ACROSS LARGE METROS

Source: Authors’ calculations
Notes: Percentages of ﬁlers with mortgage interest deduction are categorized into two adjusted gross income (AGI) groups: <$100K
and >$100K imply an AGI less than or greater than $100,000, respectively.

TAX SAVINGS ACROSS METRO AREAS AND
INCOME GROUPS
Table 1 shows average tax savings for 15 representative
large metropolitan areas, and ten small metropolitan areas
(the appendix contains this information for all metro areas in
the data),8 with the beneﬁciaries split into two groups: those
above $100,000 of income and those below. The most revealing datum from the table is how few tax ﬁlers earning below
$100,000 beneﬁt from the MID, regardless of metro area. For
example, Minneapolis has by far the most tax ﬁlers earning
below $100,000 who take the MID, at 31.5%, but even there,
the gap between tax ﬁlers under and over $100,000 in AGI
is large, as nearly 85 percent of tax ﬁlers earning more than
$100,000 beneﬁt from the MID. About 25 percent of taxpayers earning under $100,000 take the mortgage interest
deduction.
Houston has the smallest percentage of tax filers under
$100,000 that beneﬁt from the MID, with just under 16 percent receive any tax savings, while more than four times
that proportion of taxpayers in Houston earning more than
$100,000 beneﬁt from the deduction. The share of tax ﬁlers
that beneﬁt from the MID and earn more than $100,000 is
between three and four times larger than those earning less
than $100,000 in most cities.
8. We chose large and small metropolitan areas to be geographically representative.
Large metro areas are chosen among areas with a population over 3 million. Small
metro areas are chosen from areas with a population under 1.5 million.

Smaller metropolitan areas show a similar—albeit slightly
less disparate—distribution of beneﬁts as larger metropolitan areas. While vast differences persist in the proportion
of those claiming MID between cohorts above and below
the $100,000 threshold, those earning less than $100,000 are
even less likely to receive a beneﬁt in smaller metros. For
instance, just over 10 percent of tax ﬁlers in El Paso, Texas
earning less than $100,000 take the mortgage interest deduction, while nearly 63 percent earning over $100,000 do so.
In addition to large differences in the share of tax ﬁlers above
and below the $100,000 threshold beneﬁting from the MID,
there are also substantial differences in how much money
each group saves. For instance, residents of the San Francisco-Oakland metro area who earn more than $100,000 save
$8,000 a year from the MID, more than double what residents who earn less than $100,000 save. The tax savings for
higher-income residents is more than double the savings of
lower-income residents for every metro area we examine.
A similar gap between the tax beneﬁts of upper-income and
lower-income taxpayers exists in smaller metropolitan areas
as well, with upper-income taxpayers saving between two
and three times the tax payments that lower-income residents save. The difference in average tax savings between
income groups can be attributed both to higher marginal tax
rates, which result in each dollar deducted from a higherincome ﬁler’s income creating relatively greater savings, and
to the fact that upper income taxpayers have 60 percent more
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TABLE 2: TAX SAVINGS FROM MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BETWEEN
CENTRAL CITY AND SUBURBAN RESIDENTS (REPRESENTATIVE CITIES)

Central Cities

Large Metros
Atlanta, GA
Boston, MA
Chicago, IL
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX
Denver, CO
Detroit, MI
Houston, TX
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN
New York City, NY
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
Phoenix, AZ
San Francisco- Oakland, CA
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC-MD-VA

Suburbs

% with MID
benefit

Average Tax
Savings for
MID Filers

% with MID
benefit

Average Tax
Savings for
MID Filers

24.05%
23.84%
21.27%
19.20%
29.41%
17.97%
14.28%
17.04%
32.01%
15.06%
22.49%
28.16%
24.15%
30.42%
30.92%

$2,189
$2,639
$2,362
$1,627
$2,317
$1,200
$1,745
$3,261
$2,085
$2,460
$1,491
$2,427
$4,195
$3,048
$3,191

39.20%
36.51%
36.70%
30.08%
46.66%
37.04%
25.72%
30.06%
45.18%
31.38%
37.25%
42.08%
37.65%
38.25%
44.72%

$2,221
$2,669
$2,363
$1,941
$3,012
$2,054
$1,719
$3,978
$2,521
$2,790
$2,302
$3,229
$4,894
$3,122
$3,707

mortgage interest to deduct. Their higher relative incomes
allow them to purchase more expensive homes and thus take
on larger loans.

THE MID BENEFITS SUBURBS MORE THAN
THE CITIES
In most major metropolitan areas, the percentage of suburban residents that beneﬁt from the MID is much greater
than in the central city, owing to the fact that housing prices
and incomes tend to be higher in the suburbs. This difference is the largest in Detroit, where twice the proportion of
suburbanites claim the deduction as compared to central city
residents. In cities such as Boston, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, Phoenix, San Francisco and Washington, D.C, suburban
residents are 50 percent more likely to claim the MID than
central city residents, with that ratio being slightly higher in
Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.
While suburban taxpayers are more likely to claim the MID
than those living in the central city, the average savings for
taxpayers who do claim the deduction are roughly the same.
The difference in tax savings as a result of the MID are within $100 for Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston and Washington, and even in metro areas with the greatest disparities—
such as Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Phoenix and San

Francisco—they remain within $850. The similarities in
average tax savings between central city and suburban residents likely reﬂect similar marginal tax rates, and generally
similar home values across the metropolitan area. While
wealthy people do live in cities, so do less-wealthy families
who don’t own a home or who have a mortgage and income
level too small to avail themselves of the MID.
Figure 3.1 shows how residents of representative metropolitan areas (Houston, Boston, Phoenix and Washington) claim
the MID. The pattern of relatively sparse claims near the
central city and inner-ring residential areas, compared to a
much larger percentage of tax ﬁlers in suburban enclaves
and exurbs, is apparent in all four cities to varying degrees.
Houston is the classic example, and representative of many
sun-belt cities, showing next to no MID claims in inner-city
areas and inner-ring suburbs inside of the beltline freeway
system, and an abundance of claims just outside and in the
exurb areas. Also noticeable from these maps is that, while
inner-city areas in D.C. and Boston have a relative dearth of
MID claims compared to their own suburbs, in many cases,
these areas still beneﬁt as much as the suburbs of Houston
and Phoenix.
Although less stark than the difference in the percentage
of tax ﬁlers claiming, Figure 3.2 shows the difference in the
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FIGURE 3.1: ZOOMED-IN METROS: HOUSTON, PHOENIX, D.C., BOSTON

Source: Internal Revenue Service SOI Individual Income Tax return data from 2007. The breaks shown in the legend using the Jenks
natural breaks classiﬁcation method.

FIGURE 3.2: ZOOMED-IN METROS: HOUSTON, PHOENIX, D.C., BOSTON

Source: Internal Revenue Service SOI Individual Income Tax return data from 2007. The breaks shown in the legend using the Jenks
natural breaks classiﬁcation method.
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TABLE 3: ANNUAL COST OF HOUSING SAVINGS FROM TAX EXPENDITURES

Standard Annual
Home Owning Cost

Annual Home
Owning Cost with
Tax Preferences

Large Metros
Atlanta, GA
Boston, MA
Chicago, IL
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX
Denver, CO
Detroit, MI
Houston, TX
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN
New York City, NY
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
Phoenix, AZ
San Francisco- Oakland, CA
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC-MD-VA

$17,627
$18,033
$19,479
$13,759
$17,935
$18,318
$12,662
$13,471
$19,843
$18,915
$11,264
$14,423
$37,647
$19,112
$11,464

$15,999
$11,677
$15,345
$10,853
$15,191
$16,720
$9,291
$2,819
$17,564
$8,469
$5,745
$11,785
$25,373
$12,771
$2,249

Small Metros
Austin, TX
Baton Rouge, LA
Chattanooga, TN-GA
El Paso, TX
Erie, PA
Flint, MI
Fresno, CA
Peoria, IL
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA
Wichita, KS

$17,555
$9,530
$10,882
$7,606
$6,107
$7,117
$15,432
$11,457
$25,625
$8,830

$11,967
$6,508
$8,933
$5,486
$4,759
$6,588
$13,424
$9,445
$22,706
$7,255

Large metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a
population over 3 million. Smaller metros are chosen to be geographically
representative among areas with a population under 1.5 million.

average MID claim amount across representative metropolitan areas (Houston, Boston, Phoenix and Washington). This
ﬁgure shows that, while the average beneﬁt is mostly ﬂat
across a given metropolitan area, each city has areas with
much higher average claims, heading northwest from the
capital in D.C. for example, or west-southwest from downtown Houston. These ﬁgures make that point that, even
though the inner-metropolitan distribution of beneﬁts from
housing tax breaks is substantial, the intra-metropolitan distribution adds to the skewedness of these beneﬁts.

HOW DO HOUSING TAX BENEFITS IMPACT THE
HOUSING MARKET?
Although the MID is the costliest housing tax break in the
code, the deduction for property tax payments and the exclusion of capital gains from the sale of a home also reduce tax
revenue by tens of billions of dollars. As with our analysis of
the MID, most of the tax beneﬁts for these other housing tax
breaks go to wealthier ﬁlers who live in suburbs.
A look across large metro areas shows that the annual cost
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FIGURE 4: ANNUAL COST OF HOUSING - SAVING FROM TAX EXPENDITURES

Source: Authors’ calculations
Notes: Annual cost of housing savings from tax expenditures includes deductions for both mortgage interest and property taxes
as well as the elimination of capital gains taxation.

of owning a home varies widely. The lowest cost among
the metro areas in Table 3 is Philadelphia, with an average
annual cost of homeownership just over $11,000, while San
Francisco-Oakland homeowners spend $37,600 annually.
In some instances, disentangling this particular piece of data
can be complicated. For instance, the annual cost of ownership is quite low in Washington, because homeowners carry
relatively little debt, while in Houston, another low-cost city,
it is driven by low housing prices, the result of a vast supply
of buildable land in the metro area and an uncommon lack
of regulatory interference to build on that land.
Differences in income tax rates,9 debt-to-value ratios, property taxes and local home price inﬂation all contribute to the
tax beneﬁts to owner-occupied housing. Each have differing
effects on the annual cost of homeownership. Table 3 shows
that the difference in the discount offered by housing tax
expenditures varies widely across metro areas. In Atlanta
– where marginal tax rates are relatively low, few residents
claim the MID and property tax deductions and home prices
have been tame – homeowners beneﬁt relatively little. On
the other hand, families in Washington have higher incomes
9. Our model uses only differences in income tax rates that come from income differences across areas. Income differences create income tax differences because of the
progressive federal income tax.

than in Atlanta, which means they face higher tax rates and
are more likely to take the housing deductions. Combined
with the steady increase in home prices throughout the D.C.
area, the various housing tax breaks save D.C. homeowners
more than $9,000 a year, while saving Atlanta homeowners only about $1,600. In New York, San Francisco and Los
Angeles, average annual savings exceed $10,000.
Homeowners in smaller communities beneﬁt less from housing tax breaks than people who live in bigger cities, owing to
lower incomes and home prices. Residents of Austin, Texas
have an average annual savings that exceeds $5,000, the largest of the smaller metros in the data. The only other community within this cohort whose average beneﬁt is greater than
$3,000 was Baton Rouge, La. Even homeowners in Salinas,
Calif., where home prices remain relatively high, save relatively little from the tax breaks.
The average cost savings in smaller metropolitan areas is
also driven by a narrower income distribution. Even though
there are high claim rates for tax ﬁlers earning more than
$100,000 in these areas, there’s relatively fewer of them in
small communities. In communities where incomes are low
and housing prices have plummeted, very few people have
much to gain from deviating from the standard deduction. At
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TABLE 4: AVERAGE HOME SIZE PURCHASE - WITH AND WITHOUT TAX EXPENDITURES

Current Average
Home Size (square
feet)

Estimated Average
Home Size with No Tax
Preferences (square
feet)

Large Metros
Atlanta, GA
Boston, MA
Chicago, IL
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX
Denver, CO
Detroit, MI
Houston, TX
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN
New York City, NY
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
Phoenix, AZ
San Francisco- Oakland, CA
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC-MD-VA

2654
2221
2359
2383
2215
2408
2345
2059
1979
1927
2527
2094
2051
2168
2689

2350
1487
1819
1839
1824
2146
1709
977
1705
1087
1499
1667
1408
1480
1265

Small Metros
Austin, TX
Baton Rouge, LA
Chattanooga, TN-GA
El Paso, TX
Erie, PA
Flint, MI
Fresno, CA
Peoria, IL
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA
Wichita, KS

2290
3121
2089
1621
1800
1447
2042
2471
2014
1989

1584
2162
1670
1166
1375
1311
1728
1984
1737
1591

Large metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a
population over 3 million. Smaller metros are chosen to be geographically
representative among areas with a population under 1.5 million.

the bottom end of the distribution, homeowners who itemize
their taxes in Flint, Mich., and Erie, Pa., save an average of
less than $1,500 a year.
The tax code does not adjust for different costs of living
across the country: a $300,000 annual income could make
someone feel rich in Peoria, Ill. but staunchly middle class
in Manhattan. The MID effectively adjusts for cost-of-living differences by giving people in high-cost areas a bigger
break, albeit along with wealthy people in low-cost areas as
well.

At the same time, housing tax breaks also inﬂuence where
people choose to live. Fewer people would leave the hinterlands for the big city if it weren’t for the fact that the tax
code can reduce their effective cost of buying a home once
they get there.

THE TAX CODE CREATED MCMANSIONS
The one tangible result of the MID that is beyond dispute
is that it has resulted in larger, more expensive homes. This
is a result inimical to economic growth: if society allocates
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FIGURE 5: DIFFERENCE IN HOME SIZE DUE TO HOUSING TAX EXPENDITURES

Source: Estimates of increased square footage from Hanson (2012)
Notes: Additional average home size is measured in square footage by tax expenditure savings including deductions for both
mortgage interest and property taxes as well as the elimination of capital gains taxation.

more capital to construct larger houses, it means there is less
money available for companies to invest expanding proﬁtable operations.
There is nothing wrong with people choosing to spend more
of their wealth on housing, or for them to move up to a bigger
house as their income grows. To some degree, the fact that
we live in nicer and larger homes than a generation or two
ago is a manifestation of the gradual increase in income for
the middle class. But there is no reason for the government
to provide ﬁnancial encouragement for people to buy bigger
and better homes. Moreover, there is substantial evidence
that the decades-long increase in the size of the average U.S.
house owes more to insipid tax policy than to our growing
wealth.

HOW MUCH DOES THE TAX CODE INCREASE
HOUSING SIZE?
Economists have shown that home purchasers are
quite sensitive to tax-induced changes in the annual cost of
home ownership, but not in the ways lobbyists of the housing industry tend to claim. When the tax beneﬁts to housing increase, we don’t see more people buying homes but
instead, people buy bigger homes.

Table 4 shows both the current distribution of home sizes (in
square footage) across metropolitan areas, and our estimate
for how different the average size of homes would be without
tax preferences for housing. These estimates are based on
how strongly home buyers react to the cost reduction from
housing tax preferences.
In some areas with large homes, like Atlanta, the estimated
effect is small. The current average size of a single-family
dwelling in Atlanta is about 2,650 square feet, only slightly
larger than our estimates show would be the case in this market if not for tax beneﬁts. In other areas, like Los Angeles, the
tax expenditures are pushing the purchase of homes that are
more than double what our estimates suggest would be, if not
for the generous tax breaks afforded to home buyers. The
inducement to buy larger homes is also apparent in smaller
metropolitan areas, although to a smaller extent, with most
of these areas experiencing about a 400-square-foot bump
in average home size.
The map below displays the difference between actual average home sizes and our estimates of how homes would be
sized in markets without tax breaks. Across the country,
housing tax breaks contribute to larger homes. The effect is
most noticeable in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia and Los
Angeles, where the average home size is more than 1,000
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FIGURE 6: CORRELATION BETWEEN HOUSING COST CHANGE AND HOME SIZE CHANGE

square feet larger than we estimate that it would have been
in the absence of favored treatment for housing. While still
inducing signiﬁcant changes in the size of home purchased,
the magnitude of difference in home size is smaller for Midwestern and Southern cities, which is largely driven by a
smaller propensity of residents in these regions to use the
deduction.
Differences in the size home that residents choose as a
result of tax breaks are driven by the fact that the breaks
make housing cheaper to purchase on the margin. This effect
is magniﬁed in areas with higher incomes, as the discount
afforded to those in the top tax brackets results in an even
larger cost reduction from deductions. On top of this, the
capital gains exclusion ensures that a growing amount of
income from the sale of a home will be earned tax free, making the tax breaks especially valuable in hot housing markets
like San Francisco.
The graphic below shows a strong correlation between the
cost reduction from housing tax breaks and the resulting
increase in home size, using data from 120 metropolitan
areas across the United States. Where housing tax breaks
offer the largest reduction in cost, the metro areas tend to
have the largest estimated increases in size relative to how
large houses would have been in the absence of these breaks.
Cities in the Northeast (New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C.) and California (San Francisco, Los Angeles, San
Jose) are well represented in the tail of the ﬁgure, showing

both large cost reductions and larger-than-expected homes.
This is not to say that places like New York or San Francisco
have especially large homes. They do not. Rather, our conclusion is that they would have even smaller homes, on average,
if not for the associated tax breaks.
The question that naturally arises when thinking about how
housing tax breaks change buyers’ decisions is, “doesn’t the
cost reduction from these tax breaks also encourage homeownership?” The answer is a resounding “no,” a conclusion that is conﬁrmed by numerous empirical studies, as
well as a look at the design of the incentives themselves.10
The size of the standard deduction makes most of the tax
breaks useless to most homeowners. Those who do claim
the deductions are upper-income tax ﬁlers, who are not on
the margin between owning and renting a home. Rather, the
choices they face include the number of bedrooms, whether
to demand a ﬁnished basement or a home with more elaborate ﬁxtures on a larger lot.

WHAT MIGHT A REAL HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICY
LOOK LIKE?
Let us grant the assumption that homeownership does
convey tangible societal beneﬁts that make it worthy of some
10. Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) ﬁnd no correlation between generosity of the mortgage interest deduction and homeownership rates using national time series data.
Hanson (2012) ﬁnds no correlation between mortgage interest deduction policies at
the state level and homeownership rates.
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form of government policy preference. What would a policy
designed to encourage ownership look like, if we were starting from scratch?
For starters, there would be no government tax breaks or
subsidies available to the wealthy, who can easily afford
houses without such incentives. The amount of the subsidy
would not be tied to the size of the mortgage, either, and
most of the subsidy would be received immediately, when
the aspiring middle-class homeowners are young and presumably earning less than in subsequent years.

The nomenclatura of Washington D.C. recognize this as
well. Few bother to put forward a policy rationale for keeping housing-related deductions in the tax code. Instead, they
protest that the immense power of the lobbies that beneﬁt from these breaks are reason enough not to even bother
spending the immense political capital necessary to ﬁx the
problem.

It doesn’t take a team of economists to arrive at these precepts. A number of states have their own homeownership
incentive programs that attempt to do precisely this. These
programs also differ from the plethora of tax breaks at the
federal level by being less expensive, while also much more
effective at helping people buy houses.
For example, the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) offers assistance to ﬁrst-time
home buyers with an income below approximately $90,000
who are purchasing a home that costs less than $250,000.
The program substantially defrays closing costs, which can
be a serious impediment to buying a home for young families who have not had time to accumulate signiﬁcant savings.
WHEDA assistance is provided in the form of low-interest
loans, which are recouped by wrapping them into the mortgage payment. On net, the program costs the state nearly
nothing. Wisconsin’s home ownership rate is 70 percent,
more than ﬁve percentage points higher than the national
average, even though the median income in the state is below
the national average.
Common sense reforms to the current package of federal tax
breaks for housing have been proposed from both sides of the
political aisle. President George W. Bush’s tax reform panel,
as well as President Barack Obama’s National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, both have recommended scaling back housing’s tax-preferred status. These plans
both recommend capping the size of mortgage that qualiﬁes
for subsidy. They both recommend eliminating the deductibility of mortgage interest in favor of a tax credit, which
would limit the subsidy to upper-income taxpayers, while
simultaneously expanding it at the lower end of the income
distribution. Other intermediate steps toward using subsidy
dollars to encourage ownership could include eliminating
tax breaks on anything but a primary residence and limiting
the amount of housing capital gains exempt from taxation.
In an era when entitlement costs threaten to balloon the federal budget deﬁcit beyond the mere $1 trillion of recent years,
sacriﬁcing $150 billion a year to a tax break that utterly fails
at achieving its ostensible goal and gives the preponderance
of its beneﬁts to the well-off is a luxury the federal government can no longer afford.
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APPENDIX: METHOD OF QUANTIFYING THE TAX
BENEFITS OF OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING
The U.S. income tax code offers several provisions that
favor owner-occupied housing. The largest of these are the
mortgage interest deduction ($640 billion, FY 2014-2018);
the exclusion of imputed rental income ($437 billion, FY
2014-2018); the exclusion of capital gains on home sales
($263 billion, FY 2014-2018); and the deductibility of state
and local property taxes ($137 billion, FY 2014-1018).11 While
homeowners beneﬁt by not counting imputed rent or gains
from the sale of a home as taxable income, the mortgage
interest and property tax deduction beneﬁts accrue only to
tax ﬁlers who itemize deductions. Given the rise in the standard deduction, and several years of historically low mortgage interest rates, only about a third of the tax-ﬁling population itemizes deductions.
Both the mortgage interest and property tax deductions
work the same way. They are line items on a tax return that
reduce the amount of income subject to tax. Because the
U.S. income tax code has a graduated rate structure (marginal rates rise with income), deductions provide more tax
savings to those at the upper part of the income distribution. Consider two tax ﬁlers both paying $5,000 in mortgage interest, one in the top bracket (39.6 percent) and the
other in the bottom bracket (10 percent). The taxes saved
because of the MID for the top-bracket ﬁler are $1,980, and
only $500 for the bottom-bracket ﬁler. In reality, these differences are exacerbated by the fact that upper-income tax
ﬁlers live in larger, more expensive homes and in areas with
higher property taxes, and thus have larger deductions than
those in lower tax brackets.
To accurately quantify the difference in tax beneﬁts across
areas, this report ﬁrst examines Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) data on actual MID claims. This data comes from a
special release of the IRS ZIP code ﬁle in 2007, which reports
the number of tax ﬁlers claiming the MID and the dollars
deducted under the MID. This data also contains information on both adjusted gross and taxable income, allowing an
estimate of marginal tax rates, so that a reasonably accurate
measure of the actual tax savings can be calculated.
To summarize the combined beneﬁts of the major tax preferences for housing (MID, property tax deduction, and capital
gains exclusion) we measure how they reduce the annual
average cost of homeownership at the metropolitan area level.12 Following a long tradition of research in economics, we
11. Tax policy experts often point out that under a pure Haig-Simons view of the
income tax, a mortgage interest deduction is necessary to balance owner-occupied
net beneﬁts with landlord net beneﬁts for housing. This is because in a Haig-Simons
income tax, the imputed rent— or value that owner occupiers get from living in their
house and not actually paying rent— would be counted as income. Because imputed
rent is not taxed, and the logistics behind accurately counting it as income seem
intractable, we do not consider their treatment in this analysis.
12. We also incorporate the degree to which tax ﬁlers use housing tax expenditures,

represent the annual cost of homeownership in a user cost
framework. This framework considers most of the major
reoccurring costs associated with homeownership as a percentage of the purchase price. The user cost model we use,
without the preferential tax treatment for housing, is represented by the following equation:
A=(0r 1 +(1–0)r2+m+d+ tp -²t))V H
Where is the annual cost of owning a home and VH is the
value of the home. 0 represents the share of the home that
is debt ﬁnanced, and is the interest rate paid on that debt.
The user cost model also considers that any portion of the
home that is paid in equity (1–0), is subject to the opportunity cost at an interest rate, r2. Also included are annual
costs for maintenance (m) and depreciation (d), and property taxes (tp). Finally, the user cost model considers that
housing markets are subject to general price inﬂation (or
possible deﬂation), and that this is a beneﬁt to homeowners.
Price inﬂation is measured in the parameter. This would be
negative (and add to cost) if the local market has price deﬂation. Notice that when housing is treated like other assets,
the capital gain from price inﬂation is subject to tax at rate t .
Amending the user cost model to incorporate housing tax
preferences, we eliminate the taxation of capital gains (price
inﬂation), and insert deductions for both mortgage interest
and property taxes at marginal tax rate t. The user cost model with housing tax preferences is then:
A=((1–t)0r 1+(1–0)r2+m+d+(1–t)tp - V H
Where the parameters are the same as described above. We
incorporate local housing market data from the American
Housing Survey on property taxes, debt ﬁnancing and selfreported home values, combined with IRS data on marginal
tax rates to examine how the annual costs of homeownership
differ as a result of the tax code across metropolitan areas.13
We take the results from the user cost model and apply them
to each metropolitan area housing market to examine how
the package of housing tax preferences inﬂuences the choice
of how much housing to purchase. To do this, we incorporate
the ﬁndings in Hanson (2012) that estimates the sensitivity
of housing size to tax-driven changes in the cost of housing. Hanson (2012) ﬁnds that the primary function of housing tax preferences is to encourage the purchase of a larger
home, and not to encourage renters to become owners. We
use these results, compared with actual data on home size
distribution, to estimate how much larger homes are in metropolitan areas because of housing tax preferences.

based on the fraction of tax ﬁlers that itemize deductions in each metropolitan
area. To do this, we calculate a weighted average annual cost for itemizers and nonitemizers at the metropolitan area level.
13. We use a nationally representative mortgage interest rate of 4 percent, an opportunity cost of capital of 2 percent, annual maintenance rate of 2 percent and depreciation rate of 1 percent across all metropolitan areas.
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